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Abstract
We consider the problem of how societies should be partitioned
into classes if individuals express their views about who should be put
with whom in the same class. A non-bossy social aggregator depends
only on those cells of the individual partitions the society members
classify themselves in. This fact allows us to concentrate on a cor-
responding opinion graph for each prole of views. By means of
natural sovereignty, liberalism, and equal treatment requirements, we
characterize the non-bossy aggregators generating partitions in which
the social classes are renements of the weakly connected components
of the opinion graph.
JEL Classication : D71
Keywords : social aggregation, group identity, liberalism, non-bossiness
1 Introduction
In this paper we study the formation of groups or classes from a social choice
perspective. Adapting the framework of Fishburn and Rubinstein (1986), we
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consider an environment in which every individual has a view about how the
society should be partitioned into classes. A group identity function assigns
then to each prole of views a societal decomposition into classes. In the
aggregation problem considered here the number of classes is endogenously
determined. This is in contrast to environments in which the number of
social groups is assumed to be xed and their names matter (cf. Çengelci
and Sanver 2010, Dimitrov et al. 2007, Houy 2007, Kasher and Rubinstein
1997, Miller 2008, Samet and Schmeidler 2003, among others).
The most studied rule in the context of aggregating partitions is the
conjunctive aggregator which classies two individuals in the same social
group if and only if everyone in the society thinks so. This function belongs
to the class of rules characterized by Fishburn and Rubinstein (1986) in the
context of the aggregation of equivalence relations (see also Mirkin 1975,
Barthélemy et al. 1986, Barthélemy 1988, Dimitrov et al. 2011) and it was
recently axiomatized by Houy (2007) in the context of group identication.
The central axiom in most of these characterizations is a binary independence
condition requiring the decision of whether or not two individuals belong to
the same social class to depend only on the individual classications with
respect to these two individuals.
By contrast, we concentrate in this paper on non-bossy social aggregation
which requires the group identity function to depend only on one cell from
the individual partition of each society member  namely on the cell the
corresponding individual classies himself in. Intuitively, non-bossiness thus
states that the decision of whether or not two individuals belong to the same
class should not depend on the view of unconcerned individuals. Put in a
di¤erent way, non-bossiness makes the social aggregation dependent on the
information provided only by a corresponding opinion graph on the set of
individuals. A directed edge (i; j) in this graph corresponds to the situation
in which individual i classies himself in the same group with individual
j. The group identity functions we introduce in this paper correspond to
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particular ways of decomposing this graph. Specically, any group identity
function satisfying a positive liberalism condition and a simple sovereignty
requirement decomposes the graph into particular renements of its weakly
connected components. Having described the set of admissible partitions
from which such a group identity function selects the societal classication,
we then introduce natural equal treatment requirements as to narrow the
admisible set and to characterize the non-bossy rule generating the coarsest
admissible partition.
2 Basic denitions and notation
The society is denoted by N = f1; : : : ; ng, and  is the set of all partitions of
N . Recall that a partition of N is a collection of non-empty, pairwise disjoint
subsets of N whose union is N . We call these subsets groups or classes. A
partition  is said to rene another partition 0, denoted by   0, if every
group from  is contained in some group from 0; we also say in this case
that 0 is coarser than . The renement relation is a partial ordering on .
For each i 2 N , individual is view is i 2 . Moreover, for each j 2 N ,
we denote by ij the cell in the partition 
i that contains individual j. For




5 = f2; 3; 5g 2 1 then, according to individual 1,
individuals 2, 3, and 5 should belong to the same social group. A prole
of individual views is denoted by  := (1; : : : ; n) 2 N . For i 2 N and
0i 2 , we write ( i; 0i) to denote the prole at which is view i is
replaced by 0i. Moreover, N denotes the partition of N into singletons.
Let D  N contain (N ; : : : ; N) and (fNg ; : : : ; fNg). A group identity
function on D is a mapping f : D !  which assigns to each prole  2 D of
individual views a partition f () 2  of the society into social groups. For
all i 2 N , f ()i is the social group to which individual i belongs according
to f .
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For any i 2 N and i 2 , denote by i 2  any partition such that
ii = 
i
i. That is, 
i and i may di¤er only with respect to the cells individual
i does not belong to.
Non-Bossiness (NB): A group identity function f satises Non-Bossiness





Non-bossiness thus requires that an individual can inuence the social
classication only via his individual opinion about the social group he himself
belongs to.1
Note that Fishburn and Rubinsteins conjunctive aggregator does not
satisfy NB. To see this, take  2 D to be such that f1; 2g 2 i for all i 2 N .
Further, for some j 2 N n f1; 2g, let j be such that f1g ; f2g 2 j. Then,
the conjunctive aggregator classies 1 and 2 together if the prole is , while




; thus, NB is
violated.
As is easily veried by repeated application of NB, the non-bossiness
condition restricts a group identity function to depend only on the individual
views with respect to the groups the corresponding individuals themselves
belong to:
Fact A group identity function f satises NB if and only if f () = f (0)
for all ;0 2 D with ii = 0ii for all i 2 N .
This fact allows us to look at an underlying opinion graphwhen search-
ing for non-bossy social aggregators. Recall that a directed graph H = (V;E)
consists of a set of vertices V and a set of directed edges E  V  V . Let
X  V . We say that X is weakly connected if, for every i; j 2 X, there is
a sequence of vertices k1; k2; : : : ; km 2 X for some positive integer m such
that k1 = i, km = j, and either (k`; k`+1) 2 E or (k`+1; k`) 2 E for each
1 Our condition is closely related to, but not a literal adaptation of, the non-bossiness
condition introduced by Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) in the context of social
choice functions.
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1  `  m   1; if one only requires (k`; k`+1) 2 E for each 1  `  m   1,
the set X of vertices is called strongly connected. We call X a weakly
(strongly) connected component if it is weakly (strongly) connected and, for
all Y  N which properly contain X, Y is not weakly (strongly) connected.
The weak (strong) decomposition of H is its (unique) decomposition into
weakly (strongly) connected components. Clearly, the strong decomposition
of H is a renement of its weak decomposition.
To describe the decompositions we study in the next section, we construct
an opinion graph H = (V; E) for each  2 D, where V = N and E =
f(i; j) : i 6= j; j 2 iig. Notice again that the Fact mentioned above allows
us to restrict ourselves to the information provided by H. More precisely,
the group identity functions presented in this paper assign to each prole of
individual views particular renements of the weakly connected components
in H.










Figure 1: An eight-member society
Figure 1 depicts a society consisting of eight individuals. Given the above
denitions, H has two weakly connected components  f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7g and
f8g, and three strongly connected components  f1; 2; 3g, f4; 5; 6; 7g, and
f8g.
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3 Weakly connected components and their
renements
We consider two simple axioms and describe rst the set of admissible par-
titions from which any group identity function that satises the two axioms
selects the societal classication. We then introduce natural equal treat-
ment requirements as to narrow the admissible set and to characterize the
non-bossy rule generating the coarsest admissible partition.
The rst axiom has a liberal avor and states that the aggregator puts
two individuals in the same social group provided that both individuals think
that they belong together (cf. Houy 2007).
Positive Liberalism (PL): A group identity function f satises Positive
Liberalism if for every prole  2 D and all i; j 2 N , i 2 jj and j 2 ii imply
f ()i = f ()j.
In order to explain our next axiom, Negative Group Sovereignty, imagine
a situation in which the society N is partitioned into two non-empty subsets
N1 and N2. Consider the case in which every individual in N1 thinks that
he belongs in the same group with individuals only from N1 and that every
individual in N2 puts himself in the same group with individuals only from
N2. Then, it seems reasonable to require that an aggregator should not
classify an individual from N1 and a second one from N2 as being members
of the same social group.
Negative Group Sovereignty (NGS): A group identity function f satises
Negative Group Sovereignty if for every prole  2 D and for any two disjoint
subsets N1 and N2 of N with N = N1[N2 we have that ii  N1 and 
j
j  N2
for all i 2 N1 and all j 2 N2 imply f ()i 6= f ()j for all i 2 N1 and all
j 2 N2.
As we show next, a group identity function satisfying PL and NGS nec-
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essarily selects, for each  2 D, a partition f () from the set R () we
introduce now.
The coarsest partition contained inR () is  (), the partition ofN into
weakly connected components in H. The nest partition  () included in
R () replaces each D 2  () by its nest partition D = fD1; : : : ; DKg
for which the following condition is satised: for all k 2 f1; : : : ; Kg and all
i 2 Dk and j 2 D, we have that j 2 ii and i 2 
j
j imply j 2 Dk.
The set R () is then dened as follows:
R () = f 2  :  ()     ()g :
Thus, each social class in every partition  in R () belongs to a renement




for some weakly connected component
D in H.
Let us have a look again at Fig. 1 and describe the way the correspond-
ing axioms restrict the decomposition of the depicted society. First, by NGS,
the eighth individual cannot be grouped in the same class with any other
individual. Second, by PL, the following individuals have to be classied
together: 1, 2, and 3; and 4 and 5. Hence, the coarsest partition com-
patible with these restrictions is ff1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7g ; f8gg, while the nest
one is ff1; 2; 3g ; f4; 5g ; f6g ; f7g ; f8gg. Note that the societal classication
into strongly connected components ff1; 2; 3g ; f4; 5; 6; 7g ; f8gg is compati-
ble with NGS and PL as well, and it is a member of the set R () for the
problem considered in Fig. 1.
Proposition 1 A group identity function f satises PL and NGS if and only
if f () 2 R () for all  2 D. Moreover, the two axioms are independent.
Proof. Let f be such that f () 2 R () for all  2 D. Notice then that
f satises PL as, for all  2 D, any partition in R () classies in the same
group any two individuals i and j with i 2 jj and j 2 ii. Suppose now that
f violates NGS. This implies that there is some prole 0 2 D and a partition
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of N into two non-empty subsets N1 and N2 with 0ii  N1 and 
0j
j  N2
for all i 2 N1 and all j 2 N2 such that f (0)k1 = f (
0)k2 for some k1 2 N1
and k2 2 N2. Notice that we have in such a case a direct contradiction to
f (0) 2 R (0).
Consider now a group identity function f which satises PL and NGS,
and take  2 D. In what follows we show that f () =2 R () leads to a
contradiction.
(1) Consider rst the case in which there is D0 2 f () that strictly
contains some D 2  () (and thus, jD0j  2). Dene then N1 := D and
N2 := N nD and note that both sets are non-empty. Let k 2 D = N1 and
k0 2 D0 n D  N2. Since D 2  (), we have ii  N1 for all i 2 N1 and
jj  N2 for all j 2 N2. Hence, by NGS, we should have f ()k 6= f ()k0 in
contradiction to f ()k = f ()k0 = D
0.
(2) We show next that it is impossible for f () to contain a social class
which is a strict subset of some class from the nest partition  () contained
in R (). If this were the case, there would exist groups D0, D00 and D000 s.t.
D0  D00 2 D000 and D0 2 f (). However, this would imply that we can
nd individuals i 2 D0 and j 2 D00 nD0 such that i 2 jj and j 2 ii. By PL,
f ()i = f ()j in contradiction to f ()i = D
0 and j =2 D0.
We conclude that f () 2 R ().
In order to show the independence of the axioms, consider the following
two rules. Each rule satises one of the axioms but not the other. Moreover,
for each of these rules, there is a prole  2 N s.t. f () =2 R ().
(not PL) Take the aggregator f 0 dened as follows: for all  2 D, f 0 () =
N . This aggregator clearly violates PL while satisfying NGS. We have for
this rule that f 0 (fNg ; : : : ; fNg) =2 R (fNg ; : : : ; fNg) = ffNgg.
(not NGS) Consider the aggregator f 00 dened as follows: for all  2
D, f 00 () = fNg. This rule satises PL but not NGS, and we have that
f 00 (N ; : : : ; N) =2 R (N ; : : : ; N) = fNg.
This completes the proof.
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Our next condition is an equal treatment requirement. It says that all
pairs of individuals in a prole such that one but only one individual of the
pair puts himself/herself together in a class with the other should be treated
in the same way.
Equal Treatment (ET): A group identity function f satises Equal Treat-
ment if for every prole  2 D and all i; j; k; ` 2 N , we have that j 2 ii,
i =2 jj and ` 2 kk, k =2 `` imply j 2 f ()i ) ` 2 f ()k.
Proposition 2 A group identity function f satises PL, NGS, and ET if
and only if f () 2 f () ;  ()g for all  2 D. Moreover, the three
axioms are independent.
Proof. It follows from Proposition 1 that f satises PL and NGS. As it can
be easily seen, f satises ET as well. Let now f satisfy PL, NGS, and ET
and take  2 D. If  is such that for some X 2  () there are i; j 2 X
with j 2 ii and j =2 ii, then i 2 f()j follows by PL. ET requires then that
for all k; ` 2 N , we have ` 2 f()k if ` 2 kk and k =2 ``. Hence, all members
of a weakly connected component belong to the same social group which, by
the repeated application of NGS, gives us  (). If no X 2  () contains
two individuals with the above property, then the repeated application of ET
requires that the wishes of all i; j 2 N with j 2 ii and j =2 ii are either all
granted or all denied. Thus, applying NGS repeatedly delivers either  ()
(if all wishes are denied) or  () (if all wishes are granted). Finally, the
aggregators f 0 and f 00 constructed in the proof of Proposition 1 serve also as
examples for the independence of PL and NGS, respectively. As for our last
axiom, the rule f 000 assigning to each  2 D the strong decomposition of H
satises PL and NGS while violating ET.
Remark 1 One can strengthen the Equal Treatment axiom by requiring that
for every prole  2 D and all i; j; k; ` 2 N with i 6= j and k 6= `, we
have that j 2 ii and ` 2 kk imply j 2 f ()i ) ` 2 f ()k. Call this
condition ET+; evidently, ET+ implies ET. It is easy to see that NGS to-
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gether with ET+ restrict f to select a partition from the set fN ;  ()g for
all  2 D. More precisely, if  = (N ; : : : ; N), then f () = N follows by
NGS; and if i 2 jj for some i; j 2 N with i 6= j, then ET+ can be satised
either if i 2 f ()j holds for all such pairs or for none of them. Hence,
f () 2 fN ;  ()g follows by the additional application of NGS.
Remark 2 Not every group identity function satisfying PL, NGS, and ET
(or ET+) is non-bossy. Consider for instance a society of three members
having the views 1 = ff1; 2g ; f3gg, 2 = 3 = ff1g ; f2g ; f3gg, and let
 = ff1; 2g; f3gg and 0 = ff1g; f2g; f3gg. Dene a group identity function
f as follows: f selects  if the individual views w.r.t. their own classication
are as above and individual 3 thinks that individuals 1 and 2 belong together,
and f selects 0 if the individual views w.r.t. their own classication are as
above and individual 3 does not think that individuals 1 and 2 belong to-
gether, and f selects the partition into weakly connected components in any
other case. Clearly, f then satises PL, NGS, and both versions of ET but
violates non-bossiness.
The following condition strengthens the Equal Treatment requirement by
imposing it not only within but also across proles.
Strong Equal Treatment (SET): A group identity function f satises
Strong Equal Treatment if for all ;0 2 D and all i; j; k; ` 2 N , we have
that j 2 ii, i =2 
j
j and ` 2 0kk , k =2 0`` imply j 2 f ()i ) ` 2 f (0)k.
Proposition 3 A group identity function f satises PL, NGS, and SET if
and only if for all  2 D we have either f () =  () or f () =  ().
Moreover, the three axioms are independent and together imply non-bossiness.
Proof. Let f satisfy these three axioms. By Proposition 2, f () 2
f () ;  ()g holds for all  2 D. Let  and 0 be two di¤erent pro-
les such that  () 6=  () and  (0) 6=  (0). In order to prove our
statement it su¢ ces to show thatf () =  () and f (0) =  (0) lead
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to a contradiction. Note rst that f (0) =  (0) 6=  (0) implies j 2 0ii
and i =2 0jj for some i; j 2 N ; moreover, j 2 f (0)i. On the other hand,
f () =  () 6=  () implies the existence of k; ` 2 N with ` 2 kk, k =2 ``,
and ` =2 f ()k. Hence, we have a violation of SET. Note nally that the
aggregators f 0, f 00, and f 000 constructed in the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2
serve also as examples for the independence of PL, NGS, and SET, respec-
tively. The non-bossiness condition is then trivially satised as for all  2 D









Proposition 4 Let n  3 and f be a group identity function dened on the
unrestricted domain D = N . Then f satises PL, NGS, and SET if and
only if f () =  () for all  2 N .
Proof. Let  2 D be such that ii = fi; jg, 
j
j = fi; j; kg, and kk = fi; j; kg
for i; j; k 2 N . By twofold application of PL, k 2 f ()i, hence by SET
f () =  (). The additional use of SET results then in f () =  () for
all  2 N .
Remark 3 As the proof of Proposition 4 shows, axioms PL, NGS and SET
characterize the non-bossy aggregation rule f  dened by f  () =  () for
all  2 D provided that the domain D contains a prole  2 N s.t. for
some X 2  () there are i; j 2 X with j 2 ii and i =2 
j
j.
4 Discussion and conclusion
This paper is devoted to the study of group identication problems in which
the decision of whether or not two individuals belong to the same class does
not depend on the view of unconcerned individuals. In this setup, a graph
representation of the individual views allowed us to introduce new group
identity functions and to characterize them in terms of appropriate (positive)
liberalism and (negative) sovereignty axioms.
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It is natural to ask whether characterization results for non-bossy group
identity functions can be obtained if one uses a negatively formulated liber-
alism axiom and a positive counterpart of the negative sovereignty condition.
Specically, consider the following negative liberalism axiom introduced in
Houy (2007). It requires that two individuals belong to di¤erent social groups
if at least one of them thinks so.
Negative Liberalism (NL): A group identity function f satises Nega-
tive Liberalism if for every prole  2 D and all i; j 2 N , i =2 jj implies
f ()i 6= f ()j.
As is easily seen, all social groups generated by any group identity function
satisfying NL must form a clique as two individuals are put in the same social
group only if they classify each other in the given prole as members of the
same class. Formally, given a prole of individual partitions, a clique is a
subset D  N such that for all i; j 2 D, j 2 ii. A trivial way to satisfy NL is
to let the group identity function always select the partition into singletons,
i.e., to never put two di¤erent individuals in the same group. The following
condition represents a minimal requirement that prevents this; it can be seen
as a positive counterpart of condition NGS.
Positive Group Sovereignty (PGS): A group identity function f satises
Positive Group Sovereignty if for no prole  2 D there exist j and k such
that j 62 f()k and fjg [ f()k  ii for all i 2 fjg [ f()k.
Thus, PGS requires that the societal classication should not allow a
situation in which an individual thinks he belongs to every single individual
of a social group he is not a member of if all members of this group think they
belong to this individual and moreover to any other member of the group.
As is easily veried, PGS and NL jointly imply that the societal classication
generated at any prole of individual views is a coarsest partition into cliques.
Notice that, analogously to the case of PL and NGS, conditions NL and
PGS alone do not imply the non-bossiness condition NB either. To verify this,
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consider a situation where there are di¤erent coarsest partitions into cliques,
for instance in the situation of Fig. 1 above these are the partitions  =
ff1; 2g; f3g; f4; 5g; f6g; f7g ; f8gg and 0 = ff1g; f2; 3g; f4; 5g; f6g; f7g ; f8gg.
Dene a group identity function f as follows: f selects  if the individual
views w.r.t. their own classication are as shown in Fig. 1 and individual 6
thinks that individuals 1 and 2 belong together, f selects 0 if the individual
views w.r.t. their own classication are as shown in Fig. 1 and individual 6
does not think that individuals 1 and 2 belong together, and f selects some
coarsest partition into cliques in any other case. Clearly, f then satises
NL and PGS but violates non-bossiness. The same example shows that NL,
PGS, and SET do not imply NB either.
Finally, it turns out that no group identity function can jointly satisfy NL,
PGS, and ET+. Let N = f1; 2; 3g and 1 = ff1; 2g ; f3gg, 2 = ff1; 2; 3gg,
3 = ff1g ; f2; 3gg. For any group identity function f satisfying NL and PGS
one has f () 2 fff1; 2g ; f3gg ; ff1g ; f2; 3ggg. If f () = ff1; 2g ; f3gg,
then f grants the wish of individual 1 but not of individual 3. Similarly,
if f () = ff1g ; f2; 3gg, then f grants the wish of individual 3 but not of
individual 1. Hence, each selection violates ET+. The same example also
shows that no aggregation rule satises PGS and ET+ in combination of a
weaker version of NL only requiring that two individuals should belong to
di¤erent social groups if both of them think so.
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